Please consider the following common scenario:
1 remote PRTG server and 5 locations each with a PRTG probe on site. The five on-site probes need and can safely use the LSA because they are on an internal, secured private network. However they have a need to report back to the remote PRTG server. The PRTG server is necessarily remote because if it is on-premise and the internet circuit there goes down, there is no way for the PRTG to do alerting. Therefore a remote PRTG server is necessarily part of good design.
Considering this requirement, a remote PRTG server will then require firewall ports to be opened both for the probes to deliver data AND for the Enterprise Console / iPhone apps to view the status of the probes. Yes, the PRTG server is physically secured and yes the firewall source port can be restricted to the probe IP addresses. That is not a concern. But the firewall source port cannot be similarly restricted for iPhone / Enterprise Console apps connecting via HTTP/S because users of these systems are necessarily and always mobile.
So what is required here is that a web server is ALWAYS up and running for remote access and monitoring, but this web host is running under the Local System Account (LSA). No IT professional, anywhere, ever would find the practice of running a web server under a fully privileged account like LSA. But it is necessarily a requirement due to how PRTG has implemented remote iPhone/Console access to PRTG via HTTP/S. This is an ENORMOUS security risk that is wildly outside of what is considered best practice by any security conscious IT professional. Why do you find this to be acceptable? Considering that the PRTG core often holds many credentials to access remote systems, this particular use of LSA for an HTTP/S web server seems especially egregious and dangerous.
I do not find any of your replies thus far to be reasonable or acceptable responses. Please consult with your security team about this seemingly overlooked vulnerability in the PRTG design.
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